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INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant results in the matching literature is the one establishing that the set of stable matchings has a lattice structure. A set has a lattice structure if we can define on it a partial ordering and two binary operations (the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound). The structure is important for at least two reasons. First, it indicates that even if agents of the same side of the market compete for agents of the other side, this conflict is attenuated since, on the set of stable matchings, agents of the same side have a coincidence of interests. Second, it has proved to be very useful: many algorithms that yield stable matchings (and are used in real centralized markets) are based on this lattice structure, or some related properties.' The lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for the marriage model was first established by Knuth (1976) , who attributed the result to Conway. Roth (1985) showed that the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound used by Knuth (1976) did not work in a more general many-tomany model. Blair (1988) proposed a natural extension of the partial ordering used in Knuth (1976) . However, this was flawed because its least upper bound and greatest lower bound were unnatural and intrincate since they were obtained as the outcomes of nontrivial sequences of matchings. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) extended the result of the marriage model to the college admissions problem with responsive preferences. Our objective here is to further extend their result by proposing, for a many-to-one model with substitutable and q-separable preferences, two very natural binary operations that give a lattice structure to the set of stable matchings. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) referred to the "college admissions model with substitutable preferences" as the class of allocation problems consisting of matching agents who can be divided, from the very beginning, into two disjoint subsets: institutions (called firms) and individuals (called workers). Firms are restricted to having substitutable preferences over subsets of workers, while workers may have all possible (strict) orderings over the set of firms. Each firm, on one side, '~0 t h (1984, 1986, 1990 and 1991) ; Mongell and Roth (1991) ; Roth and Xing (1994) and Romero-Medina (1997) are examples of papers studying particular matching problems like entry-level professional labor markets, student admissions at colleges, american sororities, etc. See Gusfield and Irving (1989) for algorithms exploiting the structure of the set of stable matchings.
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44 1 has to be matched with a group of workers, on the other side, although both, firms and workers, may remain unmatched. A matching p is called stable if all agents have acceptable partners and there is no unmatched worker-firm pair who both would prefer to be matched to each other rather than staying with their current partners.
In the two more specific models already mentioned at the beg~nning of this introduction, the marriage model and the college admissions problem with responsive preferences,2 the set of stable matchings has a special lattice structure. We can define on it the partial ordering 3 that has p ?/ p' if every firm considers the set of partners in matching p at least as good as the set of partners in matching p'. Replacing "firm" by "worker" in the definition above we obtain another partial ordering >_w whichcoincides with 5F. Moreover, given two stable matchings we can first let firms choose the best subset of workers and second, we can let them choose the worse one; these are usually called the "pointing" functions and they are the least upper bound and the greatest. lower bound relative to the partial order k3 (we have already referred to them as binary operations). Surprisingly, in both cases we get another stable matching. Moreover, the stable matching obtained when firms choose the best set of partners is in fact the one we would have obtained if we had let workers choose the worse of the two firms; and vice versa, the one obtained by letting firms choose the worse subset is in fact the same one obtained after workers had chosen their best partner.
In this paper we identify a weaker condition than responsweness, called separability with quota, or q-separability, that together with substitutability partly restores the natural interpretation of the lattice structure of the set of stable many-to-one matchings. Moreover, we also show that even under q-separable and substitutable preferences the classical pointing functions may not be matchings (see Ekamples 1 and 2). Roth (1985) already had a counterexample showing that this may be the case for a more general many-to-many model. We: want to emphasize that our examples have a genuine interest and they are not a consequence of Roth's (1985) negative result since our model is much more specific.
The paper has also a positive side. We show that, under q-separable and substitutable preferences of firms, and given two stable matchings, 'see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a precise and formal definition of' responsive preferences as well as for a masterful analysis of both models.
if we only ask to each worker to choose the best firm of the two, we obtain an stable matching; similarly, if we ask them to choose the worst one (Theorem 1). Moreover, with these two "pointing" functions for the workers, the set of stable matchings has a very natural lattice structure with the partial order tw (Corollary 3). Finally, combining our result (Theorem 1) and a result in Blair (1988) we exhibit another partial order (Sw, the "opposite" unanimous partial order of the workers) that together with these two new pointing functions endow the set of stable matchings with another lattice structure (Corollary 4).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the preliminary notation and definitions. Section 3 contains the definition of a lattice and the statements of the results. Finally, Section 4 contains the proof of Theorem 1, the key result of the paper.
PRELIMINARIES
There are two disjoint sets of agents, the set of nfirms F and the set of m workers W. Each firm F E 3 has a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation P(F) over the set of all subsets of W, and each worker has a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation P(w) over 3 U 0. Preferences profiles are (n + m)-tuples of preference relations and they are represented by P = (P(Fl) , . . . , P(F,); P(wl) , . . . , P(w,)). Given a preference relation of a firm P(F) the subsets of workers preferred to the empty set by F are called acceptable; therefore, we are allowing that firm F may prefer not hiring any worker rather than hiring unacceptable subsets of workers. Similarly, given a preference relation of a worker P(w) the firms preferred by w to the empty set are called acceptable; in this case we are allowing that worker w may prefer to remain unemployed rather than working for an unacceptable firm. To express preference relations in a concise manner, and since only acceptable partners will matter, we will represent preference relations as lists of acceptable partners. 
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The assignment problem consists of matching workers with firms maintaining the bilateral nature of their relationship and allowing for the possibility that both, firms and workers, may remain unmatched. Formally, DEFINITION 1 A matching p is a mapping from the set 3 U W into the set of all subsets of 3 U W such that for all w E W and F E 3:
(1) Either Ip(w)l= 1 and p(w) g 3 or else p(w) = 0.
A matching p is said to be one-to-one if firms can hire at most one worker; namely, condition 2 is replaced by: Either Jp(F)(= 1 and p(F) S W or else p(F) = 0. The model in which all matchings are one-to-one is also known in the literature as the marriage model. To represent matchings concisely we will follow the widespread notation where, for instance, given 3 = {F1, F2, F3} and W = {wl, w 2 , 1~3 , wq} represents the matching where firm F, is matched to workerrs w3 and w4, firm Fz is matched to worker wl, and firm F 3 and worker wz are unmatched.
Let P be a preference profile. Given a set S C W, let Ch(,S, P(F)) denote firm F's most-preferred subset of S according to its p:reference ordering P(F). A matching p is blocked by a worker w if 0Pjw)p(w); that is, worker w prefers being unemployed rather than working for firm p(w). Similarly, p is blocked by afirm F if p (F) # Ch(p(I;'j, P(F)).
We say that a matching is individually rational if it is not blocked by 3~e will often abuse notation by omitting the brackets to denote a set with a unique element. For instance here, we write p(w) = F instead of p (w) = {F}. Downloaded by [Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona] at 03:42 30 March 2012 any individual agent. A matching p is blocked by a worker-firm pair (w, F ) if w 4 p(F), w E Ch(p(F) U (w), P(F)), and FP(w) p(w); that is, if they are not matched through p, firm F wants to hire w, and worker w prefers firm F rather than firm p(w). DEFINITION 2 A matching p is stable if it is not blocked by any individual agent or any worker-firm pair.
Given a preference profile P, denote the set of stable matchings by S(P). It is easy to construct examples of preference profiles with the property that the set of stable matchings is empty. These examples share the feature that at least one firm regards a subset of workers as being complements. This is the reason why the literature has made use of the restriction that workers are regarded as substitutes in the sense that firms continue to want to employ a worker even if other workers become ~navailable.~ DEFINITION 3 A firm F's preference ordering P(F) satisfies substitutability if for any set S containing workers w and w ( w # w), if w E Ch (S, P(F)) then w E Ch(S\{w), P ( F ) ) .
A preference profile P is substitutable if for each firm F, the preference ordering P(F) satisfies substitutability. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) proved that when firms have substitutable preferences, the set of stable matchings is always nonempty and coincides with the weak core; that is, there is no loss of generality if we assume that all blocking power is carried out by either individual agents or by worker-firm pairs. Moreover, the deferred-acceptance algorithms produce either the firm-optimal stable matching p~ or the worker-optimal stable matching pw, depending on whether the firms or the workers make the offers. The firm (worker)-optimal stable matching is unanimously considered by all firms (respectively, workers) to be the best among all stable matchings.
We will assume that firms' preferences satisfy a further restriction called q-separability.5 This is based on two ideas. First, separability, which says that the division between good workers (wP(F) 0) and bad 4~e l s o and Crawford (1982) were the first to use this property (under the name of "gross substitutability condition") in a cardinal matching model with salaries.
5See Martinez, M a d , Neme and Oviedo (2000) for a detailed discussion of this restriction.
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workers (Q)P(F)w) guides the ordering of subsets in the sense that adding a good worker leads to a better set, while adding a bad ~korker leads to a worse set.6 Second, each firm F has in addition a maximum number of positions to be filled: its quota q~. This limitation may arise from, for example, technological, legal, or budgetary reasons. Since we are interested in stable matchings we incorporate it in the prekrence ordering of the firm. Therefore, even if the number of good workers for firm F is larger than its quota qF, all sets of workers. with cardinality strictly larger than qF will be unacceptable. Formally, DEFINITION 4 A firm F's preference ordering P(F) over sets of workers is qF-separable if: (a) for all S $ W such that IS) < qF and w $ S we have that (SU {w)) P(F)S if and only if wP(F)@, and (b) BP(.F)S for all S such that IS1 > qF.
For the purpose of studying the set of stable matchings, condition (b) in this definition could be replaced by the following condition:
(Ch(S, P(F))l< qFfor all S such that I S 1 > qF. We choose condition (b) since it is simpler. Sonmez (1996) used an alternative approach which consists of deleting condition (b) in the definition but then requiring in the definition of a matching that Ip(F)I < q~ for all F E 3.
Given a set of firms 3, we will denote by q = (qF)FEF :he list of quotas and we will say that a preference profile P is q-st?parable if each P(F) is qF-separable. In principle we may have firms with different quotas. It is easy to construct examples which show that, in general and given a list of quotas q, the sets of q-separable and substitutable preferences are unrelated. Moreover, even if d l firms have q-separable preferences the set of stable matchings may be empty.
From now on we will assume that firms have q-separable and substitutable preferences. Martinez, Mass6, Neme and Oviedo (2000) establishes the fact that, under these assumptions, agents are either "single" or matched in all stable m a t~h i n~s .~ Since we will use this fact later on we state it formally as a Remark. %onmez (1996) and Dutta and Mass6 (1997) have used separable preferences in matching models. It is a condition that has been extensively used in social choice; see, for instance, Barberl, Sonneschein, and Zhou (1991). 7~e say that w and F are single in a matching p if fi (w) = 0 and p(F) = @.
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Remark 1 Assume firms have q-separable and substitutable preferences. If an agent is single in a stable matching p, then he is single in any stable matching p'.
THE LATTICE STRUCTURE OF THE SET OF STABLE MATCHINGS
In our context we can define a lattice on S(P) if there exist a partial order >. and two binary operations V and A on S(P) such that for all 111, p2, u E S(P) the following properties hold:
Conditions (1) and (2) say that v and A are binary operations on S(P).
Conditions (3)-(6) say that p1Vp2 and plAp2 are, respectively, the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound of p1 and p2 according to the partial order 2
. The quadruple (S(P), k , V, A) is called a lattice on S(P).
We will explore several possibilities of defining partial orderings and binary operations needed to construct a lattice on S(P). First, we define the unanimous partial orders kF and kw as follows: PI t -~ p2 H piR(F)p2 for all F €3. pi k w p2 H p l R ( F ) p~ for all w E W.
We are following the convention of extending preferences from the original sets (2W and 3 U 0) to the set of matchings. However, we now have to consider weak orderings since the matchings p1 and p2 may associate an individual with the same partner. These orderings are denoted by R(F) and R(w). For instance, to say that all firms prefer matching p3 to any stable matching means that for any stable matching p we have that p3R(F)p for every F € 3 (that is, either p3(F) =
dF) or else PF (F)P(F)p(F)).
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Second, we consider the natural extension of the "pointing" function used in the marriage and college admissions models. Given two matchings p1 and p2, suppose we are letting firms select the best set of workers assigned to them through p1 and p2. Simultaneously, we are letting workers select the worst firm matched with them through pl and p2. In this way, define the pointing function p1 V3 p2 on 3 L W by: The lattice theorem for the marriage model (Knuth, 1976) and the college admissions problem (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) says that (S(P), ? y , V 3 , A3) and (S(P), k w , Vw, Aw) are lattices on S(P). Moreover, if p, and p2 are stable matchings, then p1 t T p 2 e~ p2 t w PI, PI VF p2 = pi AW ~2 , and p1 A 3 p2 = p1 VW p2. TO see that in our many-to-one framework, with q-separable and substitutable preferences, (S(P), k3, V+, A+) and (S(P), tw , VW, Aw) may not be lattices on S(P) consider Example 1 below.
Example 1 Let 3 = {Fl, F2) and W = {wl , w2, w3, w4) be the two sets of agents with the profile of preferences P, where
It is easy to see that both, P(F1) and P(F2) are 2-separable and substitutable. However, they are not responsive since (WZ, w4) P(Fl) (~2 ,~3 ) and ( w I , w~) P(F2) (~2~~3 ) but (~3 ) P(F1) (~4 ) and {w2} P(F2) {wl). Moreover, the set of stable matchings consists of the following four matchings:
Consider the two stable matchings p1 and p2. Since pl(F1) = {wl, w3) P(Fl) (w2, w4) = p2 (Fl) and p1(w3) = FI P(w3) F 2 = p2(w3) we have that p1 V 3 ~2 ( F l )
= F 2 ,~1 VW ~2(F1) = (~2 , w4), and p1 Vw pp(w3) = F1. Therefore, the pointing functions pl V p p2 and p1 Vw p2 are not even matchings. Now, we could first redefine the pointing functions of the firms in two ways by, given matchings pl and p2, only asking each firm to select Symmetrically, define the pointing function pl &p2 on 3 1J W by associating with each firm the worst set of workers and with each worker the corresponding firm that selects him, if any.
However, Example 2 below shows that these pointing functions are not binary operations because again, p1 p2 and pl &p2 nnay not be matchings even if p1 and pz are stable and firms have substixutable and q-separable preferences.
Example 2 Let 3 = {Fl , F2) and W = {wl , w2, w3, w4) be the two sets of agents with the substitutable and (2,2) -separable pr'ofile of preferences P, where Notice that P is not responsive. Consider the following stable Second and definitely, we can redefine the pointing functions for the workers also in two ways by, given matchings p1 and p2, only asking each worker to select the best (the worst) firm. Namely, given p1 and p2, define the function p1 Vw p2 on F U W by: We can now state the main result of the paper.
THEOREM 1 Let P be a profile of substitutable and q-separable preferences and assume that p1 and p2 are stable. Then, p1 Aw pz and p1 Yw p2 are both stable matchings.
The proof that p1 nw p2 is stable will consist of two steps. We will first note, by applying Theorem 7 in Roth (1985) , that the matching obtained by giving to each firm the "choice set of the union of pl and p i ' is stable. Second, Proposition 2 below will establish that this matching is indeed p1 Aw p2. The following example, taken from Roth (1985) , shows that :,t araTheorem 1, as well as Proposition 2, are false without the q-.>p bility condition.
DEFINITION 5 Given matchings
Example 3 (Roth, 1985) Let 3 = { F l , F2, F3, F4, F5 ) be the set of firms and W = { w l , w2, w3, w4, w5, w 6 ) be the set of workers. As in Roth (1985) , it will not be necessary to specify the full preference ordering of each agent, since they may be extended in several wiiys and still preserve the substitutability of the firms' preferences. The preference profile is as follows:
Notice that P(F,), P(F2), and P(F4) are not q-separable. Coninder the following two stable matchings and First, it is easy to check that p1 Aw p2(F1) = { w l , w4) since PI Aw p2(w1) = F1 and p1 AW p2 (w4 Once we have established the stability of p1 r\, p2 and p1 yw p2 it is immediate to see that properties (1) to (6) of the definition of a lattice on S(P) are satisfied using the unanimous partial order kw. Therefore, we can state the first consequence of Theorem 1 in the form of the following corollary.
COROLLARY 3 Let P be a profile of substitutable and q-separable preferences. Then, (S(P), k w, A, V) is a lattice on S(P), where A = fiw and V = yw.
Following Blair (1988) , define the partial ordering 2 : on S(P) as follows: given matchings p1 and p2, PI k: p2 * Ch(pl(F) Up2(F),P(F)) = pl(F) for all F E F .
Theorem 4.5 of Blair (1988) says that if firms have substitutable preferences, then pl 2; p 2 e p2 k w pl for all stable matchings p1 and p2. Therefore, as a conclusion of Theorem 1 we can also state the following corollary, which can be seen as the "conflict" counterpart of the previous natural lattice structure (S(P), kw, r\w, yw) since it uses for the firms the opposite unanimous ordering of the workers as the partial order on S(P).
COROLLARY 4 Let P be a profile of substitutable and q-separable preferences. Then, (S(P), >_%, A, V) is a lattice on S(P), where A = yw and V = &. Proof The individual rationality of matching y,, for each worker is a direct consequence of its definition. We will first show that yw is individually rational for each firm F E 3; namely, p1 Yw p2(F) = Ch(p1 yW p2(F), P(F)) for all F € 3 . Since Ch(S, P(F)) denotes firm F's most-preferred subset of S, we have that Ch(pl yw p2(F), P(F)) C_ pl yw p2(F) for all F E 3. Assume there exists F E 3 such that Ch (PI YW P~( P ) , V)) 5 PI vw 112(P). Then, we have that ICh(p1 VW Because i i ,~, u l ( F ) or i i ,~, u~( F ) , we have that ii,P(F)0 and by the q-separability of P(F) that holds. But since ii, E pl yw p2(F) Condition (3) means that Chi:,q Yw p2(F), P(F)) is not firm P's most-preferred subset of p1 yw ,u2(F), which is a contradiction.
To finish with the proof that pl yw pz is a stable matching, assume that the pair (6, P) blocks p1 yw p2; namely, and We distinguish between the following two cases:
Case 1 lpl yw p2(P)( < qp. Then, the pair (ii,, P) also blocks both , u1 and p2, because by Condition (4) we have that for k = 1, 2, which also implies that ii, $ pk (F) . Since 1 pk ( P ) 1 .
: qp (by Lemma 6), ii,P(3)0 and g-separability of P(F) we have that by the substitutability of ~( p ) . Therefore, and again by the substitutability of ~( k ) , we have that w E ch(p2(P) U {w), P(F)). But since w E p1 yw p2(P)\p2(g) we have that b ( w ) p 2 (w) which implies that the pair (w, F) blocks p2. Therefore, condition (6) holds. Finally, and applying again the assumption that P(R) is substitutable, we have that which contradicts (5) since wl E p1 yWp2(P).
